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Abstract 
The development of digital product platforms is a prevailing trend in many industries. As 
firms incorporate digital technologies into established product categories, they need to 
manage tensions on multiple organizational layers including strategy, technology and 
structure. Recent findings suggest that tensions are most likely to be managed by creating 
resource and coordination flexibility. This paper reports a longitudinal case study of 
developing a digital product platform. By drawing on organizational ambidexterity 
theory, we identify four mechanisms—re-scripting, centralizing, redirecting and 
decoupling—through which the firm creates resource and coordination flexibility. The 
resulting resource and coordination flexibility in turn lead to the transformation of the 
firm’s strategy, technology and internal structure. The contribution of this study is in 
adopting an internal perspective and a bottom-up approach which help to theorize the 
evolution of digitized products into digital product platforms in an emergent way.  
Keywords: Digital product platforms, digital transformation, organizational ambidexterity, 
autonomous cars 
Introduction 
Understanding the organizing for developing digitized products is of great interest to scholars and 
practitioners (Yoo 2012; Lyytinen et al. 2018; de Reuver et al. 2018). Today, firms are increasingly 
integrating digital components (e.g., software) into physical product environments (e.g., cars) to tap into 
new avenues for value creation (e.g., self-driving cars) (Yoo et al. 2012; Hukal and Henfridsson 2018). To 
leverage the integrative capacity of digital technologies, firms continuously tune and dynamically 
reconfigure technical and organizational resources towards certain goals (Sandberg et al. 2020). This is a 
challenging task, however, since existing resources together with accumulated knowledge bases are catered 
towards existing products that are characterized by stable revenue prospects or market boundaries (March 
1991; O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). The tuning of organizational resources is thus accompanied by 
transforming the “old” towards the “new” (Gregory et al. 2019; Venkatraman 2017). 
To illustrate, most car manufactures have been equipping their vehicles with automatic functionalities to 
assist drivers during their journey. Automatic functionalities present an industry standard for almost newly 
produced premium vehicles and have been accordingly institutionalized within organizational boundaries 
with dedicated resources and teams. A promising market segment such as Mobility-as-a-Service (i.e., MaaS) 
on the other hand, is considered to be a risky business venture. While entering the MaaS market may create 
novel use cases such as on-demand autonomous transportation, it requires substantial organizational 
resources and capabilities in areas including the development of autonomous vehicles, the operation of 
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highly responsive real-time platform architectures, and the safe management of third-party software. Thus, 
the aforementioned digital innovations (Yoo et al. 2010) for producing new market offerings (Nambisan et 
al. 2017) are likely to cause transformative changes (Sandberg et al. 2020) in different organizational layers 
such as strategy, technology, and operational structures (Gregory et al. 2019).  
That being said, such transformation and its translation at the operational level within organizations (e.g., 
managing competences, work processes or product evolution) is still in many ways an understudied area. 
Prior research has provided useful insights into how digital innovation leads to the emergence of “new” 
products, services, business models, and organizing rationale (e.g., Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013). 
However, digital innovation in incumbent firms is not limited to the emergence of the “new”; it also includes 
the challenges of transforming the “old”. The study by Svahn et al. (2017), for instance, uncovered multiple 
tension points the Swedish car manufacturer, Volvo, faced while transforming traditional cars into a 
platform for connected car services (i.e., digital product platforms). Specifically, the study illustrates various 
internal and external struggles or “concerns” in areas such as innovation capability, governance, and 
collaboration. However, the way the shift from traditional cars to connected car services was managed at 
the operational level, or whether the technological changes had fundamentally transformed internal 
structures have remained opaque in the aforementioned study.  
This is however an important organizational aspect to understand since these fundamental changes in 
various organizational layers enable firms to dynamically and continuously respond to drastic market or 
technological changes to ensure their long-term survival (O’Reilly and Tushman 2008). In other words, 
theorizing how or whether organizing digital innovation leads to digital transformation is a worthwhile 
research inquiry (Gregory et al. 2019). Similarly, from an operational viewpoint, prior studies have 
generally suggested that as firms integrate digital components into physical products, they transition from 
an internal production-oriented logic to an external supply-chain innovation organizing logic (Thomas et 
al. 2014; Sandberg et al. 2020). Yet, how such changes in one layer, (e.g., technology) causes ripple effects 
in other layers (e.g., strategy or internal firm structures), has received limited attention (Sandberg et al. 
2020; Gregory et al. 2019). Understanding the interconnection of these layers is important for identifying 
the drivers and trajectories of digital transformation and better managing its emergent and contingent 
nature (Staykova 2018; Warner and Wäger 2019). To understand how digital transformation occurs and 
how it could be managed in various organizational layers, we propose the following research question:  
How does digital transformation unfold as firms digitize products towards digital product platforms? 
To account for how the organizing towards digital innovation leads to digital transformation within firms’ 
interrelated organizational layers (e.g., strategy, technology, and structure), we have analyzed the case of 
the Swedish car manufacturer, NEVS, as it decided to enter the promising market of mobility services. 
During our study, NEVS was facing considerable market uncertainties (i.e., strategy layer), while 
continuously re-organizing its self-driving technology (i.e., technology layer) and work teams (i.e., 
structure layer) towards achieving its MaaS vision. Through longitudinal first-hand observations we a) 
detail the tensions between existing and new requisite strategies, technologies and structures, b) analyze 
how NEVS balanced these tension points, and c) and explain how these tensions lead to transformations 
within NEVS’ organizational layers. By studying tension points in organizational layers that are caused by 
digital innovations, we employ and contribute to the literature on organizational ambidexterity (O’Reilly 
and Tushman 2013). Organizational ambidexterity provides a suitable theoretical frame to understand the 
tension and balancing logic within organizations when the “old” is facing the “new” on its path towards 
organizational equilibria. In this study, the old (i.e., automatic function of a car) with reliable revenue 
prospects and market boundaries is in tension with a new and unproven market segment (i.e., MaaS) that 
require balancing mechanisms in the aforementioned organizational layers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain how the digitization of products 
leads to tensions within organizational layers. The section is followed by an account of organizational 
ambidexterity as an appropriate lens for studying those tensions and efforts towards achieving 
organizational equilibria. We then describe the research setting and approach, and present the results, 
which are subsequently discussed. The paper ends by implications and suggestions for future research. 
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Balancing Digital Innovation  
Studying how firms manage the digitization of physical products into digital product platforms presents a 
suitable setting for theorizing the relationship between digital innovation and digital transformation. 
Today, ubiquitous computing and modularity, as well as the availability of cheaper, smaller, and more 
powerful technologies have changed nearly all aspects of firms’ in how they create and deliver value 
(Gregory 2019; Sørensen 2018; Tilson et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2010). With flexible and cost-effective 
component reconfigurations, digitized products can be easily repurposed for new emerging uses cases (Yoo, 
2012). As firms embed digital components into physical product environments, these digitized products 
become hybrids or digital product platforms, characterized with agnostic functionalities with third parties 
that may exceed the original product use case (Yoo et al. 2010). The latter is synonymous with innovation 
or business networks, and if successful, its revenues may exceed the revenues of physical products they are 
built on. That being said, the prevailing trend of digitized products, however, poses several challenges, 
particularly for traditional orientated firms on different organizational layers. 
Take business strategies as an example. Business strategies relying on tightly and vertically integrated value 
chain economies are particularly difficult to replace with new and promising ones like digitized products 
for innovation networks, as these types of economies differ in their value creation logic (Gregory et al. 2019; 
Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998). Transformation of business strategies is particularly demanding for pre-digital 
industries such as the automotive industry. Piccinini et al. (2015) reveal in their study how IT-enabled 
business transformations bring about tensions between accommodating the short lifecycle of digital 
technology innovations (e.g., business agility), while trying to accommodate the long lifecycle of industrial 
product innovations (e.g., business stability). The authors also posit the need to balance the contentious 
relationship between short-term digital technology investments and the investments in long-term digital 
capabilities for fast-changing markets. These problems get arguably amplified when firms pursue digital 
innovations in the realm of digital product platforms combined with new market entry ambitions (e.g., 
MaaS). Besides business strategies, the study by Svahn et al. (2017) suggests that the combination of digital 
and physical components in most cases results in architectural innovations for existing product categories, 
which in turn transforms existing knowledge bases. Similarly, being able to respond to fast-changing 
market dynamics calls for capabilities within organizational boundaries such as tuning work structures that 
can respond to the aforementioned market dynamics in the first place (e.g. Mohagheghzadeh and Svahn 
2016). This is particularly difficult for firms with well-established work divisions, routines, and 
institutionalized knowledge bases, which support their past decision makings (Winter et al. 2014; Gregory 
et al. 2019). 
Overall, the above-mentioned studies convey two central issues related to digital transformation; first, 
digitizing products suggests constant balancing activities in various organizational layers, such as strategy 
(e.g. product versus platform), technology (e.g., product architecture), and structure (e.g., work teams). In 
their call for theorizing the crossroad between digital innovation and digital transformation, Gregory et al. 
(2019) similarly identify three overarching organizational layers, namely, strategy, technology, and 
structure and emphasize that these layers are in constant negotiations with each other in achieving 
balances. In this study, we argue that digital transformation can be considered as a multi-layered 
organizational phenomenon where transformation in one layer may causes ripple effects in other layers and 
vice versa. Second, since transformation in one layer can trigger changes in other layers, digital 
transformation is also an emergent phenomenon (Gregory et al. 2019; Staykova 2018). Thus, there is a need 
for a holistic view that not only identifies multiple triggers of digital transformation but also reflects the 
need for organizing digital innovations in a dynamic and contingent way.  
The importance of balancing such tensions as firms engage in innovative undertakings has been studied in 
the organizational ambidexterity literature. Prior studies on digital product platforms (e.g. Svahn et al. 
2017) have similarly suggested to adopt an organizational ambidexterity lens for uncovering the logic or 
mechanisms for balancing tensions around digital innovation within the same organization. In the same 
vein, employing organizational ambidexterity in this study as our analytical lens is highly appropriate. New 
digital product platform owners like car manufacturers continue to serve their existing markets (i.e., selling 
premium cars with automatic functionalities), and hence, behave exploitatively. At the same time, the very 
same car manufacturers explore new markets and technologies (i.e., autonomous cars for the MaaS 
economy) within the same organizational boundaries. Therefore, we posit that digital product platform 
owners have inherently the potential to be ambidextrous organizations. Additionally, employing 
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organizational ambidexterity as the analytical lens is appropriate with the specific aim of this study, i.e. 
theorizing how managing digital innovation results in organizational transformation. This is because 
ambidexterity is not simply about how firms manage or balance tensions as they engage in innovation 
(O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). Rather, the sine qua non of organizational ambidexterity is the firm’s long-
term survival by purposefully and fundamentally transforming its resource and knowledge bases (Helfat, 
et al., 2007; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; O’Reilly & Tushman 2013). 
Organizational Ambidexterity: Resource and Coordination Flexibility 
A central premise of organizational ambidexterity is the relationship between the exploration of new 
possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties (March 1991). Studies suggest that a firm’s engagement 
in the exploitation of established paths usually occurs at the expense of exploring new ones. Similarly, an 
overemphasis on exploration for new products at the exclusion of exploiting old ones may result in high 
experimentation costs, leaving many undeveloped ideas unused (March 1991). In this context, 
organizational ambidexterity refers to firms’ ability to resolve tensions between processes of exploration 
and exploitation in fast-changing environments (O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). Overall, the relationship 
between exploration and exploitation has been seen through three overarching perspectives. Summarizing 
the extant literature on organizational ambidexterity, Wei et al. (2014) refer to these perspectives as 
incompatible, interactive, and relational views. 
Based on the incompatible view, exploration and exploitation are considered to be incompatible processes 
leading to organizational tensions as both compete for scarce resources and require different organizational 
capabilities (Wei et al. 2014; Papachroni et al. 2015; Koryak et al. 2017). Based on this view, then, firms 
need to have separate episodes or departments dedicated to exploitation and exploration. The interactive 
view, on the contrary, sees exploitation and exploration as potentially complementary forces. A high degree 
of exploitative effort, for instance, can act as the absorptive capacity to generate a greater pool of 
complementary resources, which in turn improves a firm’s effectiveness in exploring new areas (Katila and 
Ahuja 2002; Cao et al. 2009; Wei et al. 2014). Firms can thus simultaneously engage in exploration and 
exploitation. However, Wei et al. (2014) argue that both perspectives offer little insight into how firms can 
organize their socio-technical configurations for sustained competitive advantage. The solution, they argue, 
lies in the relational view. From the relational view, rather than focusing on the scarcity of resources that 
dominates the incompatible view, firms need to focus on the dynamic management of their resources. 
Lacking a dynamic path in managing resources would even neutralize the complementary effects of having 
a greater resource pool, as promoted by the interactive view (Wei et al. 2014). 
Forming and testing various hypotheses based on the synthesis of prior studies, Wei et al. statistically 
demonstrate how two particular forms of dynamic resource management contribute to enhanced 
organizational ambidexterity. These two forms include creating resource flexibility and coordination 
flexibility. The authors define resource flexibility as the capabilities to accumulate flexible resources with 
multiple uses, and coordination flexibility as the capabilities to create new resource combinations through 
new internal coordination processes (Wei et al. 2014). Thus, exploitation and exploration are concluded as 
neither incompatible nor complementary in nature; instead, they become dependent on contextual 
conditions (cf. Benner and Tushman 2003; Junni et al. 2013; Koryak et al. 2017) such as resource and 
coordination flexibility. 
Valuable lessons about the importance of resource and coordination flexibility can be derived from 
Information Systems literature, as well. Digital platforms and digital innovation studies have provided us 
with ample insights about strategies for managing conflicting concerns to accommodate both existing and 
prospective organizational resources (Henfridsson and Yoo 2014), understanding competing views on 
division of innovation labor among suppliers and manufacturers (Lee and Berente 2012), building dynamic 
capabilities for digital transformation (Warner and Wäger 2019), developing managerial toolkits for 
evaluating competing innovation strategies (Nylén and Holmström 2015), balancing generativity and 
infrastructural control (Eaton et al. 2014), or managing the conflict of platform ownership and open source 
sponsorship (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2010). 
However, previous IS literature has predominantly focused on issues of resource and coordination 
flexibility from the management perspective and from an external viewpoint. We propose that 
transformation does not occur only through top-down strategizing (Leonardi 2020); it is also important to 
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understand how digital transformation unfolds at the operational level (e.g., the team’s everyday activities). 
Thus, in line with the relational view on organizational ambidexterity as well as the IS scholarship on digital 
innovation and platforms, we too emphasize the importance of creating resource and coordination 
flexibility for the long-term survival of firms. However, since we see organizational ambidexterity as 
emergent in the dialectics of top-down and bottom-up activities, we focus on the way resource and 
coordination flexibility are achieved eventually in the work of operational teams.  
Research Setting 
We selected National Electric Vehicle Sweden (NEVS) as our empirical setting. NEVS is a Swedish company 
with production plants in China and Sweden. In 2012, NEVS acquired the assets of SAAB, a former major 
Swedish car manufacturer, and continued its legacy in car manufacturing but faced financial challenges 
with its current product line. In 2016, NEVS shifted its focus from traditional cars with combustion engines 
to exclusively manufacture electric and autonomous vehicles, a new market segment in the automotive 
industry characterized by high growth opportunities. To make use of these opportunities, NEVS also revised 
its business strategy by preparing itself to sell mobility services, including ridesharing, delivery, or any other 
A-to-B services designed for end-users. This way, despite inheriting considerable know-how in traditional 
car manufacturing, NEVS has been able to develop its independent profile and knowledge base. This change 
is also mirrored in their organizational methods and structures to produce these new types of cars, reflecting 
NEVS’ transformation towards a digital-born organization (Chanias 2018; Sebastian 2017). 
On its path towards adopting a MaaS business logic, one area of concern was the legacy vehicle motion 
control system that required a complete and costly overhaul. A vehicle motion system entailed separate 
electronic units for controlling vehicle motion, such as propulsion, steering, and braking. Provided by a 
complex chain of suppliers, these electronic units came in separate parts. Each electronic control unit 
(hereafter ECU) included a hardware box in which the control software was embedded. Besides the need 
for sourcing a considerable amount of hardware parts and the management of a complex supply chain, the 
system’s performance was not optimal from a technological point of view. The speed of data communication 
between the hardware parts mentioned above was instead designed for traditional cars, which made them 
highly unsuitable for safely controlling an autonomous car in the public space. As such, NEVS saw the 
further need to develop a more software-oriented motion control system. 
That being said, the process of developing a software-oriented motion control system in-house was an 
unexplored field for NEVS, to begin with. While NEVS’ MaaS vision was apparent, the way towards re-
engineering the internal components for a new software-based motion control system for supporting the 
new vision was less clear. In what follows, we have illustrated NEVS’ exploration of new paths for reshaping 
the vehicle motion system which first emerged as a nebulous and unproven idea, survived with limited 
resources, and started to gain more attention and influence within NEVS as a MaaS providing platform. We 
have studied the work of the IVC team, who were in charge of developing the new motion control system. 
Data Collection 
Given the exploratory nature of our study, we have followed the work of other researchers in adopting an 
iterative approach in data collection and analysis (Leonardi and Bailey 2008; Henfridsson and Bygstad 
2013). In September 2017, we started our field work at NEVS to acquire an overview of the company’s 
agendas related to the development of autonomous cars and MaaS. We had learned that NEVS was 
exclusively focused on developing electric and autonomous cars as of 2016 and had gone public with its 
MaaS concept in July 2017. We thus found it an opportune case to follow the development of connected 
cars and mobility services as an example of the digitalization of the automotive industry. When we started 
our field work at NEVS, we did not intend to study the work of the IVC squad (“squad” is NEVS’ label for 
teams). We spent approximately 30 hours of conducting interviews and attending meetings with 15 key 
figures in software and connectivity divisions, product quality management, legal counsels on autonomous 
drive, and global project management. Our explorative approach had also directed us towards the work of 
the IVC squad, time and again. 
At first, it was not clear to us how this squad’s work was related to the area of connected cars and MaaS. 
The squad was more involved in the transformation of previously hardware-based vehicle motion units into 
software-based units (i.e., digitization), rather than the application of digitally connected vehicles for 
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mobility services (i.e., digitalization). As the study unfolded, we eventually discovered that the reformation 
of vehicle motion could be seen as an infrastructural step in developing mobility services (see Henfridsson 
and Bygstad, 2013). We eventually came to appreciate the survival of the squad’s work—despite the start-
up’s several financial drawbacks—as a “paradigmatic example” (Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013: p. 914) of 
digitizing physical products into service providing platforms. 
The eight-month ethnographic observation of the IVC squad took place between November 2018 and June 
2019; about a year after the initial IVC squad had started experimenting with the new motion control system 
ideas with only 2-3 members. By the time our observations started, the IVC squad’s work had picked up 
speed and consisted of six members. Joining the group at this time was particularly beneficial as they still 
had a significant amount of work left, which would give us the opportunity for first-hand observations of 
their work. More importantly, the squad members would now be able to reflect on parts of their work in 
retrospect, as well. The observation sessions included at least four complete workdays weekly and one day 
dedicated to analyzing the data, which guided the research steps in the week after. 
The IVC squad consisted of 6 developer engineers (7 counting the former lead software engineer) all seated 
in the same office area without any partitions dividing them. This spatial arrangement allowed them to 
engage in conversations constantly to brainstorm, troubleshoot, or discuss work-related issues. The first 
author who was conducting the observations was seated in the same area as the squad. As there were no 
partitions dividing the squad members, she could both see and hear them performing their work without 
interruptions. During the observations, the first author took careful field notes about not only the activities 
of the squad, and the artifacts they used, but also the topics discussed by the squad members as they 
engaged in conversations to perform their work. These notes assisted her to pose follow-up questions and 
explore new topics and areas of the squad’s work. Relevant conversations were audio-recorded and 
subsequently analyzed by the end of each week. The observations thus resembled what Hennink et al. 
(2010) describe as “watching an unfolding drama unfold with characters, events, and storylines” (p. 170). 
We also interviewed each squad member at least twice in two separate interview rounds (see Table 1). In 
the first round, we focused more on what the squad had been doing during its lifetime and how. In the 
second round of the interviews, we were particularly focused on understanding the trigger behind activities 
and initiatives in the squad. In this round, why questions were particularly dominant. For example, “why 
are you even integrating the ECUs in the first place”, “why do you think the way you work is not optimal?”, 
and “why is developing a new control system important now, why has it not happened before?” 
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Table 1. Interview Rounds 
Data Analysis 
We first adopted an exploratory approach to data to avoid missing parts that lie outside the scope of the 
selected analytic lens (Walsham 1995). In this initial round of our data analysis, we tried to identify as many 
activities and overarching events that characterized the work-life of the IVC squad. However, it is not 
surprising that eight months of intensive ethnographic fieldwork can provide data for telling a story in 
 Digitizing Products Towards Platforms 
  
Forty-First International Conference on Information Systems, India 2020
 7 
multiple directions. A “disciplined pursuit and analysis of the data” (Sarker et al. 2013), thus, required us 
to adopt a focused or selective round of analysis (Bryman 2012). Guided by our analytical lens, the focused 
analysis called for both inductively and deductively oriented approaches. These inductive and deductive 
approaches respectively correspond to two overarching analysis strategies inspired by Henfridsson (2014); 
1. Making sequence of events meaningful and 2. Naming and framing. 
Making sequence of events meaningful: Based on our analytical lens, the focus was on finding 
processes enabling resource and coordination flexibility across the three organizational layers of strategy, 
technology, and structure. We wanted to find out 1. which of the overarching events and activities identified 
in the initial round of analysis could be seen as instances of creating resource and coordination flexibility, 
and 2. to which organizational layer these events and activities correspond. Additionally, since telling a 
story requires a causal trajectory that drives the temporal progression of events and activities (Henfridsson 
2014), we were specifically sensitive towards establishing an explanation for the why of events, activities, 
and choices. The goal of this deductively oriented approach (Bryman, 2012) was to provide a delimiting 
framework for telling the story. To implement this plan, we asked four general questions exemplified below:  
What do they do? What is the 
Activity? 
What is the activity 
an instance of? 
Why do they do it? 
They form teams that 
can be dissolved at any 
point of time 
Forming 
dissolvable 
teams 
Coordination of teams 
Organizational structure 
The fast-changing combination 
of competences required for 
delivering projects 
Table 2. Identifying Activities and Events Related to the Analytical Lens 
This step enabled us to eventually order activities in a sequential way and identify three overarching courses 
of events across the three organizational layers. After finding the central constituent parts, it was time to 
explore how these parts formed the overall plot. 
Naming and framing: As mentioned previously, we intended to highlight the ‘interconnected’ and 
‘emergent’ nature of processes for creating resource and coordination flexibility. Here, we tried to 1. identify 
how events, activities, and layers were “connected” to each other, and 2. indicate how processes gradually 
form in an emergent way. To analyze the interconnection of the events, activities, and layers, we focused on 
the commonalities between activities and gave them labels, a process Henfridsson (2014) calls naming. We 
thought that activities which share central characteristics with each other could be considered as iterations 
of the same organizing process. This inductively oriented approach enabled us to eventually identify 
mechanisms through which a set of activities across various organizational layers lead to creating resource 
and coordination flexibility. An example of naming the interconnections is as follows: 
Activity Event Organizational layer Common Point (Mechanisms) 
Open new 
competence areas in-
house 
In-house 
development 
Strategy Creating flexibility in resources and 
collaboration through centralizing 
external development work 
Creating a central 
architecture for 
different control units 
Modifying 
software 
architecture 
Technology Creating flexibility in resources 
through centralizing separate 
technological units 
Table 3. Naming Mechanisms of Creating Resource and Coordination Flexibility 
Finally, to analyze the ‘emergence’ of these mechanisms, we focused on the differences and boundaries 
which separated the mechanisms and their related activities from each other; a strategy Henfridsson (2014) 
calls framing. We thought, focusing on the points where mechanisms of creating flexibility change, would 
inform us on when and why various mechanisms of change emerge. This strategy eventually enabled us to 
identify the phases through which the mechanisms eventually resulted in resource and coordination 
flexibility. An example of framing is as follows: 
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Activity Event Organizational layer Difference Point (Phases) 
Creating a central 
architecture for 
different control units 
Modifying 
software 
architecture 
Technology First, flexibility is created in 
resources by centralizing 
architectural parts 
Creating the logic for 
modularization of the 
architecture 
Modifying 
software 
architecture 
Technology Next, flexibility is created in 
resources through decoupling 
architectural parts 
Table 4. Framing Phases of Creating Resource and Coordination Flexibility 
To check the plausibility of our findings (Henfridsson 2014; Avison and Malaurent 2014), we presented 
them in three separate official presentation meetings to 1. The head of the entire software department 2. 
The firm’s technical management together with the entire management board in the software department 
(including the IVC squad’s manager), and 3. The IVC squad members. All three groups agreed that not only 
the findings were truthful to their work, but also the findings told a story that went beyond the perspective 
of one group, included various perspectives, and that the cumulative story did not contradict any group’s 
perspective. The strong point, as pointed out by the software management board and the IVC squad 
members, was that the findings captured and provided a mental template of what had been constantly 
difficult for them to explain in a concrete way in terms of the connection between separate events, their 
sequence, and their distinction. 
Results: NEVS’ Integrated Vehicle Control System Initiative 
To achieve its goal for becoming a future MaaS provider, NEVS’ legacy vehicle motion control system 
underwent several changes. Some of these changes included reducing the amount of hardware that controls 
vehicle motion, developing a new powerful and central software component for vehicle control that has 
replaced prior separated and underperforming control units, designing a flexible architecture for motion 
software to support future mobility services, building a knowledge base for developing and modifying 
vehicle motion software in-house, and reducing the dependency on suppliers. In doing so, NEVS has 
completely transformed the architecture of its legacy vehicle motion control system that reduced supplier 
dependency and provided the technical foundation for fast and flexible reconfigurations for future projects. 
Phase 1: Rethinking Motion for Mobility Service (2016-2017) 
By the time NEVS went public with its MaaS plans in 2017, the company’s head of software department and 
its technology strategist had already argued extensively that reinventing mobility without rethinking 
motion would be a half-hearted job. They reasoned that it was specifically the motion control system, which 
makes any type of mobility possible in the first place. However, the legacy motion control system stood in 
stark contrast to NEVS’ promoted mobility narrative of being “fast, flexible and customer-centric”, as the 
company’s leaders put it. For one thing, various parts of the legacy motion system were developed by 
different suppliers. Relying on an extremely complex chain of suppliers created internal barriers to become 
fast and service-oriented (coordination flexibility). As the head of the software department exemplified it: 
 To get the brake system supplier to trust the model provided by the steering system supplier, 
 wouldn’t work and it’s hard to see them wanting to share that kind of information seeing it as 
 part of their intellectual property. So, it left us with no choice. And even if you were to fix a set-up 
 where one supplier would use another supplier’s model, then for each and every change you 
 wanted to create in a project, it would be rounds of commercial agreements, a lot of contracts, a 
 lot of negotiations, and it would just slow down the execution. Speed is important. So, we saw the 
 strategic importance of reconfiguring the vehicle motion. 
Apart from the external collaboration speed, the numerous inflexible hardware parts in the legacy motion 
control system could hardly attract an ecosystem of mobility service providers. For example, the legacy 
motion control system included separate hardware units that contained the controlling software for various 
motions of the car. Besides occupying significant space in the vehicle and being slow in exchanging data 
among separate units, the existing setup of hardware parts was a major hurdle in developing flexible 
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services (resource flexibility), as confirmed by the testing and simulation engineer who works closely with 
the IVC team: 
 A regular mechanical component takes a lot of time and money for development, which causes 
 you to not really make so many variants. In case of software, however, you can just keep adding, 
 removing, or upgrading features. And when things are so dynamic, we should be ready for 
 emerging things. 
Continuous integration and modification of software parts for different mobility services requires more 
than rethinking the ratio of hardware to software. It also requires the development of dedicated and well 
attuned teams who are fast in delivering products and services for an increasing number of heterogeneous 
projects (coordination flexibility). The vehicle motion control system, for instance, needs to be made ready 
for continuous integration and modification in various mobility projects, including autonomous drive 
services. However, the traditional automotive division of labor with silos of expertise and communication 
hierarchies could not support fast work iterations or catch up with the increasing number of projects. IVC’s 
senior software engineer exemplified the customary and rigid division of labor as follows: 
 Let's say project A requires four different vehicle motion components. So, you’ll have a product 
 manager and then there are individual managers in various organizational departments 
 working with those required components. So, the product manager will tell those department 
 managers what he needs and how they need to handle it. Then department managers assign the 
 work to different engineers in their department. Same will be in all the other departments 
 involved in project A. So, you have the product manager, the department managers, the 
 engineers, or senior engineers, and all that in 4 different departments. It becomes that kind of 
 hierarchy. 
Reshaping the legacy motion control system was hence an infrastructural step in reshaping mobility 
services. The company now needed to find solutions for re-scripting its external and internal collaboration 
approaches as well as the arrangement of its technological and human resources. 
Phase 2: Launching the Integrated Vehicle Motion Control Initiative (2017-2018) 
A more efficient motion control system was initially a part that would fit properly into the bigger vision for 
MaaS. The replacement of hardware by software for digitally driven and connected vehicles made a lot of 
sense in general. Just like other car manufacturers, NEVS had started to become more software-oriented 
for autonomous vehicles starting in 2016. However, to officially dedicate resources to reshaping the entire 
legacy motion control system required strong motivations, considering the financial constraints NEVS had 
faced as a start-up so far. The fact that a whole new motion control system was not initiated by the top 
management also reinforced the dilemmas. Thus, the announcement of NEVS’ exclusive focus on electric 
and autonomous cars later in 2016 provided the grounds for an unwavering commitment to reshaping the 
legacy motion control systems during 2017 and 2018. The plan was to focus on 1. integrating all the various 
control units for vehicle motion in one central unit, and 2. to develop the entire system inhouse. 
Developing an integrated vehicle control unit (hereafter IVC=the new motion control system) inhouse 
served multiple strategic goals. An IVC would reduce the use and subsequently cost of hardware parts. More 
importantly, it would take back control of technological developments and innovations from the suppliers 
(resource flexibility). Despite the outspoken benefits of such a plan, the initiators of IVC project had to 
prevail over quite strong counterarguments. As one of the IVC developers reminded us: 
 You see, there is already a complete infrastructure developed for having separate control units, a 
 lot of knowledge already exists out there. It makes it easy to build something. So, it's already very 
 cheap; you do not have to put any work or any money into research or something. Having the 
 integrated ECU is an idea. And there are not a lot of companies working with it. With the absent 
 knowledge, it would be difficult for a big corporation to shift their strategy just like that! They can 
 work on it on some experimental vehicles. But still, you won't have the necessary knowledge, you 
 won't have the necessary experience. 
The initiators of the new motion control system (IVC), on the other hand, argued that the in-house 
development of IVC made sense from multiple perspectives. First, an IVC would be more efficient. 
Digitizing and centralizing separate motion control parts into a powerful central software would replace 
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underperforming hardware parts. However, a more valuable asset was gaining control of the brain of the 
vehicle for developing autonomous functionalities and mobility services. They argued that with the need to 
prepare the vehicle motion to be connected to external sources of command such as remote controllers, or 
Internet of Things devices, the motion control software needed to be highly modifiable. To rely on suppliers 
for the modification of the software would be time-consuming and costly. It was thus strategically important 
to build the competence knowledge in-house and take control of the vehicle motion software in future 
external projects (resource and coordination flexibility). These visions were realized in 2018, when having 
developed a proof of concept of the new motion control system (IVC) placed the company’s name on the list 
of attractive partners in a European ecosystem of autonomous drive (hereafter AD) services. The head of 
the IVC squad explained the company’s role in this project as follows: 
 Our external partner has some goals of demonstrating some autonomous drive functions in this 
 project. And NEVS' part is to deliver an enabler with the interfaces to connect the IVC to the AD 
 functionality. The motion command would be defined by the external partner and the IVC would 
 be the enabler of that command making the car move accordingly. That is essentially the intention 
 for us; to see when we have achieved this enabler. That it works together with other systems. 
Soon the enabling features of IVC would be put to test in many mobility projects of different scopes. IVC 
was now beginning to exceed its return on investment in the form of efficiency. Not only, but IVC was also 
going to be an efficient component in developing the company’s own AD services. More importantly, 
however, it was going to be a platform for continuous external development. Now, NEVS’ concept of motion 
not only fitted its concept of mobility, but it had started to gain significance in its own right. In other words, 
a basic component had gained a life of its own (resource flexibility). IVC’s former senior software engineer 
highlighted the extended strategic significance of turning IVC as a component to a flexible resource: 
 NEVS is becoming a software development organization. It’s all about creating the pattern; it's 
 about ‘how’ you're actually going to produce your product. Your approach has to give you some 
 kind of advantage. And why becoming a software development organization? Because you know, 
 almost 75 percent of the component in modern cars is software-based. And if you have a hold on 
 that portion, you basically own that car. It will give the creator a competitive advantage. That is 
 one of the goals for NEVS. 
Such flexibility in technological resources, however, had to be supported by the company’s human resources 
and internal operations. To develop a new motion control system, NEVS had to open new competence areas 
that were traditionally non-existent in-house. This required more human competences being employed and 
brought together in-house as well. In September 2018, one year of planning for forming an Agile enterprise 
(referring to the organizational approaches defined in the Agile software manifesto) resulted in a full 
reorganization of the company’s internal arrangements. The reorganization entailed several courses of 
activities. 
First, the old silos of knowledge and divisions of labor were dissolved. A total of four tribes (company’s 
name for major operational departments) now formed the company’s operational side. The idea was to 
emphasize what brought people together in the same center rather than what divided them into separate 
divisions with hopes of smoother communication and therefore operations (coordination flexibility). 
Second, within each tribe— rather than creating rigid subdivisions and permanently allocating a fixed array 
of human competences to them—a pool of human resources with diverse relevant competences was created. 
These employees had no fixed appointments to any teams. Depending on the required competences for each 
project, an average of five developers with various competence backgrounds would be assigned in a team to 
work on a project deliverable (resource flexibility). Third, all the engineering developers involved in the 
actual development work within the same tribe were centered in the same physical area at the company, 
away from managers. Similarly, the managers had their own spatial center. 
Thus, as the new motion control system (IVC) was turning into a flexible platform for mobility services, the 
internal structures were also being reconfigured towards more flexibility. However, to conclude that NEVS 
had its resource and collaboration flexibility all figured out is a misconstruction. 
Phase 3: Reflecting on the Increasing Complexities of IVC Work (2018-2019) 
Halfway into IVC’s development work, NEVS was receiving collaboration offers to provide the vehicle 
motion as a platform for testing and development of autonomous drive algorithms by external partners. In 
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addition to external projects, various internal projects also required IVC for testing autonomous 
functionalities. For all of these projects, the IVC squad needed to modify the architecture of IVC and 
redesign their work processes. The managers were quite pleased with the development. The squad 
members, however, were increasingly feeling the strain to realign their work and incorporate IVC in quite 
fast iterations for several parallel internal and external projects. Apart from the increasing workload, the 
team collaboration approach was another trigger for dissatisfaction. The Agile framework emphasized the 
direct allocation of a team to projects rather than dividing the work among several departments. This 
approach had resulted in grouping engineers from considerably different competence backgrounds in a 
team. The management strongly believed that these multi-competent teams would increase collaboration 
flexibility: 
 In the old organizational way, there would be a component owner. So, now, for developing an 
 ECU, should the component owner be a person with primarily software competence or hardware 
 competence while you need both? That is the thing! But, in this Agile mindset, a component would 
 not be owned by an individual; it will be owned by a team with both hardware and software 
 competences, because you need both to specify the requirements of an ECU in a good way. 
The multi-competent teams also believed to be beneficial in creating resource flexibility. The Agile 
framework emphasized a horizontal competence development rather than a vertical competence 
development. That is, rather than continually working within a specific competence area and gaining deep 
expertise, team members could expand their competence across several areas by collaborating with and 
learning from their team members in fulfilling project requirements. Such an Agile approach to competence 
development would create resource flexibility from multiple perspectives, the head of the software tribe 
contended: 
 The Agile mindset emphasizes that you should step out of your comfort zone, and really grab 
 tasks, and widen your knowledge. That means people will grow in multiple areas. They might not 
 become the ‘experts’ in all of them, but they will grow. And it also has the added benefit of creating 
 human competence redundancy on the company level. Unlike the old organizational form where 
 if one expert suddenly left the organization or team, the work would come to a halt. 
 Because then no mindset or force had pushed other individuals to learn about each other’s 
 expertise so they could cover for one another. 
However, as the architecture of the IVC was starting to become more complex, team members needed to 
apply deeper field expertise. It was eventually becoming impossible to understand other team members' 
perspectives (coordination flexibility), let alone learning from them. Responding to a soaring number of 
internal and external projects which incorporated the IVC as a platform, was no help either. They believed 
both the increasing complexity of the IVC architecture and the number of IVC related projects were 
becoming incompatible with the goal of the Agile framework for collaboration and competence 
development. Being pushed to work with people with quite different backgrounds while responding to 
several projects now seemed more unsystematic rather than agile, as one IVC developer put it: 
 I don't think the horizontal development is the ‘point’ with Agile teams; I think that's how it's 
 ‘happening’. Because, I think, it's only in our team maybe where you get this sort of horizontal 
 development. I don't think in every other team, which is practicing the Agile framework, you get 
 this horizontal development. It is coming out of events, and not out of what it's supposed to do. 
As the IVC architecture was becoming more complex, the Agile framework needed to accommodate more 
complex work situations. The IVC developers contended that IVC was not only becoming a complex 
component in supporting NEVS’s mobility services, but it was also evolving into a platform for future 
development work. These two existing sides of IVC needed to be taken into consideration and the Agile 
framework needed to be adapted to the IVC work to balance out the created tensions. However, the bright 
side with the Agile framework was the feedback sessions where employees could reflect on the challenges 
of their work in retrospect. In these sessions, the team members could discuss the distinctive and particular 
conditions for developing the new vehicle motion. These retrospective sessions would then provide the 
foundation to solve problematic cases iteratively. The reached solutions rendered a new version of the Agile 
framework which fitted the specific conditions of working with IVC and at the same time complying with 
the overall company’s Agile framework. 
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Phase 4: Resolving the Increasing Complexities of IVC Work (2019) 
As the IVC software continued to expand and become an integral part of various projects, proper design 
guidelines and software architecture needed to be defined. This meant a change in the focus of the team 
from vehicle dynamics to software development standards. However, neither the work guidelines nor the 
arrangement of competences in the IVC squad accommodated this emerging requirement. Design 
guidelines and software architecture were mostly missing. The written IVC software was not efficient in 
terms of performance and memory usage. The entire focus had so far been only on the integration of control 
software rather than how IVC should be implemented as an efficient software. Part of the problem was 
expected as much of the IVC squad’s work concentrated on R&D. A larger part of the problem nevertheless 
was due to the company’s emphasis on aligning work processes according to the Agile framework rather 
than following the standard ways of developing software, believed the squad’s lead software engineer: 
 Any software engineer knows this is not how you write software. See, everybody in this team 
 wrote the IVC software, but they don’t have a background in software engineering. Just because 
 we are in the same team doesn't mean we can do the same thing. Anyways, that wasn't making 
 sense. The scope of the initial IVC architecture was so little that everybody could just do  each 
 other’s work and then implement it in the software the best way a person from vehicle dynamics 
 could, thinking let’s get this up and running. But now, if you want to actually create a 
 production ready software, you need to put a hundred different things into consideration, and 
 then you need people with software backgrounds. Then, not everybody can just do the other’s 
 work, as the Agile framework insists. 
Thus, although the company’s organizing approach as a whole insisted on the Agile framework, the IVC 
developers argued that the specific conditions of developing IVC was to be taken into consideration. To 
reconcile the two, the IVC developers and software tribe managers concluded, important decouplings were 
to be made both in the IVC architecture and the team structure. 
To begin with, the IVC architecture needed to be modularized. Modularization entailed defining the 
boundaries between a set of constituting elements on various layers of the IVC architecture such as the 
network or the application layer. The separation of these parts within and across the architectural layers 
was important for two reasons. First, as a production ready software, the dependency among IVC’s 
architectural parts needed to be reduced (resource flexibility). This would allow the integrated vehicle 
motion platform to offer more flexibility for future development work. More importantly, defining 
boundaries between modules would become a reliable criterion for forming teams once the number of 
recruited IVC developers increased. That is, teams of 5-7 members would be allocated to work with a set of 
similar modules (referring, for instance, to autonomous drive functions on the application layer): 
 Now you need so many people working on different parts. To give them enough flexibility so 
 that they can work on their own part independent of the other’s, the boundaries between these 
 parts should be clearly defined. And then the model [architecture] should be defined like that, 
 too. So that they don't have to worry about the dependency between the part they are 
 developing, and the part other teams are developing. That's why we just need to define the 
 modules across architectural layers. 
This way, rather than project-based teams, module-based teams were to be formed. Module-based teams 
would still be multi-competent. However, as working with a set of similar modules would call for 
competences that are more closely related, horizontal competence development would become more 
manageable for team members (coordination flexibility). However, separating focal competence areas and 
dedicating more resources to them required the recruitment of more developers in-house. Acquiring more 
human resources needed to be backed by strong motivations from a business strategy point of view. IVC 
needed to prove potentially to be more than a component in NEVS’s future cars with some enabling 
affordances. It needed to promise potentially distinct business values. 
Having defined an initial process for modularization of the IVC architecture, finally, in June 2019, 
demonstrations of IVC started to open new paths of innovation and business coalitions for NEVS. When 
Protean, a leading firm in innovating in-wheel-motors, witnessed a demonstration of NEVS’s new vehicle 
motion control system (IVC), they immediately found it as an appropriate platform for developing their 
own products. Protean, which was already about to be acquired by NEVS, was now more confident about 
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joining NEVS. One of the IVC developers commented on the IVC’s journey from being only an idea to a 
potential source of revenue as follows: 
 IVC was only a few people’s idea. No one cared much. For example, when I would attend NEVS’ 
 all-people's meeting, IVC was never mentioned as a way of going into the future. So, in those 
 meetings I couldn’t really relate with anything. They would mention what a great job, others have 
 done in other projects, but never IVC. Until IVC was not built, it was very hard to get the 
 picture. They need to have a real demonstration. So, for example, last week, I had a demo for the 
 Protean’s top management. Although it wasn’t the reason why Protean was in that meeting, but, 
 once they saw the demo, all their management were like, ‘oh, this is exactly what we need for 
 our cars, please talk to our engineers’. 
Protean could not only use the IVC as a platform for its own innovation of in-wheel-motors, but it could 
also use the knowledge stack and expertise of the IVC developers (resource flexibility). Showcasing the 
potential for a separate line of innovation for IVC was now reinforcing the motivation for dedicating more 
resources to its development. Thus, to implement the new solutions, the initial IVC team dissolved in June 
2019. Around 20-30 developers were eventually recruited to work with the IVC (until January 2020) in 
various module-based teams. Thus, the new motion control system (IVC) opened new and unpredictable 
paths for further innovation and value creation independent of the NEVS’ own existing products and 
services. 
Discussion 
The case of NEVS vehicle motion system is an extensive example of how managing digital innovation leads 
to the transformation of organizational strategies, technology and structure in an interconnected and 
emergent way. A look at the various phases of NEVS’ transition reveals that changes on one organizational 
layer affect and depend on the configurations of other layers. NEVS’ case also demonstrates that changes 
on organizational layers are not simply created through pre-planned and bottom-up management 
initiatives. Rather, changes are motivated contingently by daily practices of operational teams. The way 
resource and coordination flexibility transform NEVS’ strategies, technology and structure is detailed 
below. We have presented NEVS’ transformation in the IVC squad’s work in four phases or mechanisms. 
The criterion for distinguishing the boundaries among these phases is the common point which connects 
and bridges a set of activities in a specific time span: 
Re-scripting. In phase 1, we witness a set of activities that are focused on creating resource and 
coordination flexibility by rethinking and re-writing 1. The way coordination with suppliers took place, 2. 
The way the vehicle motion technology was configured, and 3. The way teams and operations were 
structured to respond to the company’s new MaaS vision. What characterizes this phase is a mechanism 
that prompts the firm to reform its strategy, technology and structure. We call this mechanism that drives 
the activities in the approximate time span of 2016-2017 Re-scripting. The Re-scripting mechanism 
culminates in seeing the reformation of vehicle motion system as an infrastructural step in shaping the 
firm’s mobility visions. 
Centralizing. In phase 2 then we can spot a shift in the focus of the activities. In this phase, we witness a 
set of activities with the goal of creating resource and coordination flexibility by 1. Opening an inhouse 
development center for the previously external and distributed work to support a fast business strategy, 2. 
Centralizing the previously separate ECUs in a single unit to create coordination flexibility and efficiency 
in the technology, and 3. Bringing together people with different competence backgrounds in a team to 
create resource and coordination flexibility in teams. What characterizes this phase is thus a mechanism 
that turns the firm into a strategic hub, a center for technological innovation and a center for fast operations 
with little structural blocks. We call this mechanism that drives the activities in the approximate time span 
of 2017-2018 Centralizing. The centralizing mechanism culminates in vehicle motion turning into not just 
a component in NEVS’ final product, but a platform for shaping the company’s MaaS vision. 
Redirecting. In phase 3, we see the concerns shifting towards evaluating the increasing complexities and 
finding solutions to compensate for them. In this phase, we witness the squad members’ attempts to argue 
for resource and coordination flexibility by 1. Paying attention to the increasing number of projects in which 
IVC plays a strategic role, 2. Responding to the increasing complexities of IVC as it is turning from an R&D 
concept to a production-ready technology, and 3. Adapting the team structures to the increasing complexity 
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and scope of competences required for developing IVC. What characterizes this phase is thus a mechanism 
that turns the firm into an alert agent which actively evaluates and redirects its strategic, technological and 
structural positioning. We call this mechanism that drives the activities in the approximate time span of 
2018-2019 Redirecting. The Redirecting mechanism culminates in highlighting the specific characteristics 
of IVC which require working conditions different than the firm’s overall strategic, technological and 
structural directions. 
Decoupling. Finally, in phase 4, the activities focus on creating important distinctions from a strategic, 
technological and structural point of view. To create resource and coordination flexibility, there is a need 
to 1. Highlight the distinctive business value related to the new vehicle motion system as opposed to the 
business values of the firm’s MaaS visions, 2. Draw clear boundaries between the modules in the IVC’s 
software architecture and 3. Separate the scope of team competence areas based on the boundaries among 
software modules and layers. What characterizes this phase is thus a mechanism that enables the firm to 
have distinctive capabilities by creating loose couplings in its strategy, technology, and structure. We call 
this mechanism that drives the activities in the approximate time span of 2019 Decoupling. The Decoupling 
mechanism culminates in highlighting IVC as a potentially distinct resource for further innovation and 
value creation. These mechanisms and their related activities are illustrated in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Mechanisms of Resource and Coordination Flexibility  
The above-mentioned mechanisms describe how NEVS achieved resource and coordination flexibility 
within its organizational boundaries, which in turn supported NEVS in transitioning from its old business 
strategy (selling combustion/electric cars) to a modern MaaS provider. A closer look at Table 5 reveals that, 
the four mechanisms are not always directed at creating alignment and convergence among organizational 
strategy, technology and structure. It is clear that to re-script organizational strategy, there was a need to 
re-script organizational structure as well as its technological domain. However, positive outcomes were not 
necessarily created through consensus and unity (Robey & Boudreau, 1999). Rather, these four mechanisms 
sometimes would result in resource and coordination flexibility and solve tensions by giving rise to 
divergence points. An example is how the team structure at the IVC squad diverged from NEVS’ overall 
Agile framework. A more emblematic example is how the apparently contradictory mechanisms such as 
“centralizing” and “decoupling” were necessary for creating resource and coordination flexibility. These 
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divergences show that resource and coordination capability is formed by loose couplings (Lee and Berente 
2012; Gregory et al. 2018), both within and across organizational layers. In other words, in this complex 
interrelation of sociotechnical elements (Winter et al. 2014), pluralistic and potentially contradictory 
elements coexist (Lee and Berente 2012).  
This has implications for how processes of digital innovation are organized. For instance, the dialectics of 
divergence and convergence imply that predicting the overall formal structure of an organization based on 
the design of the underlying technical system (mirroring hypothesis) (Sanchez and Mahony 1996) is 
becoming more and more difficult. As Colfer and Baldwin (2016) emphasize and as the NEVS case 
demonstrates, “digital technologies make possible new modes of coordination that enable groups to deviate 
from classical mirroring hypothesis” (p. 710). Consequently, designing and organizing the internal 
operations of a firm around digital innovation needs to be a dynamic and contingent process. 
Emphasizing the interconnected and emergent way NEVS managed resource and coordination flexibility 
enables us to theorize digital transformation in terms of dynamic capabilities. Dynamic capabilities are 
capabilities that determine the speed and degree to which a firm’s resources can be aligned with unforeseen 
environmental changes (Teece 2014). Dynamic capabilities are not tied to any current products or purposes 
(Teece 2014) and they cannot therefore be predicted and implemented as best practices or paths in a top-
down manner by the management. In NEVS’ case, for instance, although mobility-as-a-service was the 
firm’s overall top-down strategy, motion-as-a-service was spawned by the firm’s technological 
advancements as an unpredicted strategy that would give the company a competitive advantage. 
Theorizing digital transformation in terms of dynamic capabilities is also in alignment with organizational 
ambidexterity. As mentioned previously, simply managing the tensions between exploitation and 
exploitation (innovation) does not capture the core of organizational ambidexterity (O’Reilly and Tushman 
2013). Instead, organizational ambidexterity is achieved if the firm is able to fundamentally reconfigure and 
transform its resources to survive in the face of changed market conditions, as it attempts to solve tensions 
(O’Reilly and Tushman 2008; O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). The changes on various organizational layers 
enabled NEVS to execute a two-track approach by continuing to optimize its existing technological 
foundation for vehicle motion systems (i.e., being exploitative), while simultaneously being prepared to 
serve future MaaS markets (i.e., exploratory). As explained previously, developing the capability to optimize 
existing and exploring new markets is a key feature of ambidextrous organizations. 
Finally, existing digital platform studies have provided insights into the evolution of platforms in 
collaboration with external partners (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2010; Eaton et al. 2015) or in 
collaboration with end-users and co-creators of value (Skog et al. 2018). We complement this line of 
research by studying a platform in its preparation phase, i.e., how the platform is initially designed and 
evolved prior to being ready for external collaboration. This research may exhibit limitations in terms of 
being a single case study and being applicable in other empirical contexts.  Car manufactures operate in a 
safety sensitive industry context, where firms are subject to stricter regulations for market access, hardware 
and software requirements, which in turn may impacts the degree and fluidity of innovation and 
collaboration options. On the other hand, these limitations present future avenues for research for 
conducting cross case studies in (non) safety sensitive industry contexts to validate or expand on our 
findings or having an in-depth focus on boundary resource development from an internal organizational 
perspective.  
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